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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 

 

 

MORRIS BICKLEY, MICHAEL D.                                                                                                                         CASE NO.:3:08-cv-05806-JSW


DOUGLAS PUMROY,                                                                                                                                              CLASS ACTION (FRCP 23)

 

                                                                                                                                                                              NOTICE OF RECENT DECISION IN

                                                                                                      SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION

            Plaintiffs, v.                                                                                                                                  TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO                       

                                                                                                                                                                  REINSTATE STAY

SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIERS, INC.,

                        Defendants.

10/03/2014 229  ORDER SCHEDULING TRIAL AND PRETRIAL MATTERS. Signed by Judge JEFFREY S. WHITE on 10/3/14. (jjoS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 10/3/2014) (Entered: 10/03/2014)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MORRIS BICKLEY, et al.,


Plaintiffs,
v.
SCHNEIDER NATIONAL, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 08-cv-05806-JSW


ORDER SCHEDULING TRIAL AND PRETRIAL MATTERS
Following the Case Management Conference held on September 26, 2014, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that the Case Management Statement is adopted, except as expressly modified by this
Order. It is further ORDERED that:
A. DATES
Jury Trial Date: Monday, January 11, 2016 at 8:00 a.m.,
Jury Selection: Wednesday, January 6, 2016 at 8:00 a.m.
Pretrial Conference: Monday, December 7, 2015 at 2:00 p.m.
Last Day to Hear Dispositive Motions: Friday, September 11, 2015 at 9:00 A.M.
Last Day for Expert Discovery: August 3, 2015
Close of ALL Discovery: August 31, 2015
B. DISCOVERY
The parties are reminded that a failure voluntarily to disclose information pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) or to supplement disclosures or discovery response

 

09/26/2014

228 

Minute Entry: Further Case Management Conference held on 9/26/2014 before Judge Jeffrey S. White (Date Filed: 9/26/2014). ALL Discovery due by 8/31/2015. Expert Witness List due by 8/3/2015. Jury Selection set for 1/6/2016 08:00 AM in Courtroom 5, 2nd Floor, Oakland before Hon. Jeffrey S. White. Jury Trial set for 1/11/2016 08:00 AM in Courtroom 5, 2nd Floor, Oakland before Hon. Jeffrey S. White. Motion Hearing set for 9/11/2015 09:00 AM in Courtroom 5, 2nd Floor, Oakland before Hon. Jeffrey S. White. Pretrial Conference set for 12/7/2015 02:00 PM in Courtroom 5, 2nd Floor, Oakland before Hon. Jeffrey S. White. (Court Reporter Diane Skillman.) (jjoS, COURT STAFF) (Date Filed: 9/26/2014) (Entered: 09/26/2014)

09/19/2014

227 

JOINT CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT, filed by Morris Bickley, Raymond Grewe, Dennis Vanhorn, Schneider National Carriers, Inc.. (Saltzman, Stanley) (Filed on 9/19/2014) Modified on 9/22/2014 (jlmS, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 09/19/2014)

09/16/2014

226 

ORDER by Judge JEFFREY S. WHITE denying 221 Motion to Reinstate Stay (jjoS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/16/2014) (Entered: 09/16/2014)

 

 

SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIERS, INC. WAS IN VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA SLAPP Law,see:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_lawsuit_against_public_participation

A strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) is a lawsuit that is intended to censor, intimidate and silence critics by burdening them with the cost of a legal defense until they abandon their criticism or opposition.[1]

The typical SLAPP plaintiff does not normally expect to win the lawsuit. The plaintiff's goals are accomplished if the defendant succumbs to fear, intimidation, mounting legal costs or simple exhaustion and abandons the criticism. A SLAPP may also intimidate others from participating in the debate. A SLAPP is often preceded by a legal threat.
The difficulty, of course, is that plaintiffs do not present themselves to the Court admitting that their intent is to censor, intimidate or silence their critics. Hence, the difficulty in drafting SLAPP legislation, and in applying it, is to craft an approach which affords an early termination to invalid abusive suits, without denying a legitimate day in court to valid good faith claims.

SCHNIEDER’S purpose in filing a law suit against me was to force me to drop the workman compensation claim from the injury I received 1/13/09. 
===============================================================================================

 OBJECTOR AND INTERVENOR WALTER ELLIS’S OBJECTIONS TO CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT

 

09/24/2013

149  

ORDER from 9th CCA filed re: Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 146 filed by Walter L. Ellis CCA # 13-56665. A review of the docket reflects that appellant has not paid the docketing and filing fees for this appeal. Within 21 days from the date of this order, appellant   shall: (1) file a motion with this court to proceed in forma pau peris; (2) pay$455.00 to the district court as the docketing and filing fees for this appeal and provide proof of payment to this court; or (3) otherwise show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. See the document for all of the details. Order received in this district on 9/24/2013. (dmap) (Entered: 09/24/2013)

09/23/2013

148  

NOTIFICATION by Circuit Court of Appellate Docket Number 13-56665 9th CCA regarding Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 146 . (dmap) (Entered: 09/24/2013)

09/23/2013

147  

FILING FEE LETTER issued as to Objector Walter L. Ellis re Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 146 . (dmap) (Entered: 09/23/2013)

09/20/2013

146  

NOTICE OF APPEAL to the 9th CCA filed by Objector Walter L. Ellis. Appeal of Judgment 145 . Filed On: 08/21/2013; Entered On: 08/21/2013; Filing fee $ 455 billed. (dmap) (Entered: 09/23/2013)

 

 WALTER L. ELLIS, Pro Se   E-mail: uedcinc@aol.com    
                          UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA                            

ALAN KRUMBINE, an individual, et. al.; on behalf of themselves and all

others similarly situated,

 

                     Plaintiffs,

          v.

SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIERS, INC., a Nevada Corporation,

 

                     Defendants.

 

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Case No.: 10-CV-4565-GHK (JEMx)

 

OBJECTOR AND INTERVENOR WALTER ELLIS’S OBJECTIONS TO CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT

 

 

Date:              August 5, 2013

Time:             8:30 a.m.

Ctrm:             650

Date Filed:     June 1, 2011

Judge:            Hon. George King

 

)

 

 

TO COURT AND ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to the Class Action Notice (“the Notice”) mailed to the class members in the above-entitled action, objector and intervenor Walter L. Ellis (“Ellis”) hereby objects to the final approval of the class action settlement agreement (“the Agreement”) on numerous grounds.

PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that Ellis will appear and object to the final approval of the class action settlement at the class action fairness hearing currently set to be heard on August 5, 2013.

PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that Ellis intends to file a motion to intervene in this action pursuant to the Private Attorneys General Act and he also intends to file a motion to decertify this class action.

 

Dated: June 24, 2013                                 By______________________________

                                                                                Walter L. Ellis, Pro Se

 

 

OBJECTIONS TO CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT

          Ellis hereby objects to the Agreement that was entered into in the above-entitled action between the plaintiffs, on the one hand, and the defendants on the other hand. Ellis objects to the Agreement on the following grounds:

First, Ellis objects to the Agreement on the grounds that it does not appear to be fair or adequate. The evidence suggests that there are hundreds of class members who are covered by the Agreement; however, the settlement amount is only $3,500,000 which suggests that the each class member will receive only a miniscule amount from the settlement. Defendants are very profitable companies; wherefore, it does not appear that the punishment fits the crime in this instance. Ellis argues that the settlement amount should be sufficient enough to deter other companies from engaging in similar conduct.

Second, Ellis objects to the settlement on the grounds that this action should be expanded to include additional causes of action. The evidence suggests that Defendants intentionally stole wages from Ellis and thousands of other aggrieved employees over a long period of time; wherefore, Defendants should be held liable for their wrongful acts. Additionally, Ellis argues that Defendants have a well-documented history of retaliating against employees who complain about their working conditions; wherefore, Ellis argues that this action should be expanded to include a cause of action for retaliation. Ellis further argues that this action should be expanded to include causes of action for theft and conversion of labor, fraud and deceit, conspiracy to commit fraud, violation of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act and violations of Labor Code sections 98.6, 216, 223, 232.5 and 1102.5.

Third, Ellis argues that the class should be expanded to include additional “aggrieved employees” pursuant to the PAG Act. In and around 2004, the California Legislature signed into law the PAG Act which provides that an “aggrieved employee” can file a lawsuit against an employer for any violation of the Labor Code and the other “aggrieved employees” can then benefit from a judgment entered against said employer. Ellis argues that this action should be expanded to include all “aggrieved employees” and applicants who were affected by Defendants’ Labor Code violations throughout the State of California and not just the class as defined in this lawsuit.

Fourth, Ellis objects to the Agreement on the grounds that the release is overly broad. The Agreement requires that the class members release claims that were never actually litigated in this action including, but not limited to, claims for race and gender discrimination. Additionally, the Agreement requires that the named plaintiffs release their individual claims when said claims were never actually litigated in this action. The named plaintiffs should not be punished for acting as class representatives. The Agreement specifically states that the class members are required to release all claims that “were asserted or reasonably could have been asserted in this Action”. Ellis argues that said language is overly broad and the Agreement should be revised to notify the class members that they have a right to pursue other claims against Defendants that were not explicitly released by the Agreement.

Fifth, Ellis objects to the Agreement on the grounds that the PAGA payment is insufficient and should be increased to $5,000,000. The Agreement provides that the PAGA payment will not exceed five percent of the total settlement amount which Ellis believes is insufficient to deter Defendants from further violating the Labor Code. Ellis argues that based on the facts alleged in this complaint, the PAGA penalties alone should be in excess of $25,000,000. The class attorneys have not sufficiently justified the enormous discount on the PAGA penalties; wherefore, Ellis argues that this Court should not approve the Agreement because the PAGA payment is insufficient and does not serve the goal and purpose of the PAGA statute.

Sixth, Ellis objects to the settlement on the grounds that the PAGA claims should not have been certified as a class action. The California Legislature enacted the PAG Act for the benefit of all California workers and not just a certain “class” of workers. (See Labor Code §§ 2698 et seq.) Additionally, the California Supreme Court ruled that a PAGA action is an enforcement action and need not be certified as a class action. (See Arias v. Superior Court (Angelo Dairy), 46 Cal.4th 969, 209 P.3d 923, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 (2009).) Ellis further argues that class counsel cannot prove that a class action is superior to a representative PAGA action; wherefore, Ellis argues that this Court should not approve the Agreement.

          Seventh, Ellis objects to the Agreement on the grounds that the attorneys’ fee award is excessive. The Agreement provides that the class counsel will receive 33 percent of the gross settlement fund; however, the lack of complexity and the shortness of duration of this litigation clearly do not warrant attorneys’ fees in excess of a million dollars. Additionally, lead attorneys Lee Gordon (“Gordon”) and Daniel Chaleff (“Chaleff”) spent 1591 and 431 hours, respectively, litigating this action and their assistants only spent a fraction of said time litigating this action. The evidence suggests that Gordon and Chaleff billed the class members for work that could have been performed by lesser paid assistants thereby defrauding the class members out of hundreds of thousands of dollars in attorneys’ fees. Ellis argues that this Court should not just “rubber stamp” the attorneys’ fee award requested in this action. This Court should require Gordon and Chaleff to explain why they spent more time litigating this action than their assistants in clear contradiction to well-known law firm practices.

Eighth, Ellis objects to the Agreement on the grounds that the class members were not given an opportunity to conduct discovery to determine the adequacy of the settlement that was reached in this action. The class members should be allowed to review Defendants’ financial statements in order to determine if the settlement is fair and adequate. The parties have not adequately explained why the settlement amount should not be considerably more. Ellis argues that he should be given permission to contact the other class members to discuss the fairness of the Agreement without interference from the Defendants or from class counsel.

Ninth, Ellis objects to the Agreement on the grounds that there appears to be fraud and collusion between Plaintiffs’ counsel and Defendants’ counsel. Defendants agreed to pay Plaintiffs’ counsel over $1,000,000 in attorneys’ fees; however, Plaintiffs’ counsel failed to ensure that the class members were adequately compensated for the injuries that they have sustained. Ellis hereby objects to the award of attorneys’ fees in this action. Additionally, it appears that Plaintiffs’ attorneys and Defendants’ attorneys colluded with each other to discount the PAGA claims without justification.

Finally, Ellis objects to the Agreement on the grounds that the class members should be given an opportunity to select different class counsel to represent them in this action. Ellis has received credible evidence which suggests that the class counsel appointed in this action have failed to adequately represent the class members in other class actions that they have participated in.

REQUEST FOR LEAVE OF COURT TO FILE COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION

Should this Court approve the Agreement over Ellis’s objections, Ellis hereby requests that this Court grant him leave of Court to file a complaint in intervention. Ellis argues that he has exhausted his administrative remedies with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”) and with the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) wherefore he has standing to pursue additional claims against Defendants. Ellis argues that thousands of current and former employees and applicants of Defendants will likely benefit from this action should this Court grant his request for leave of Court to file a complaint in intervention.

Ellis further argues that Defendants will not be prejudiced should this Court grant his request for leave of Court to file a complaint in intervention because Defendants have known about his claims for several years and have had ample to prepare a defense to said claims. Ellis has reason to believe that Defendants continue to discriminate against African-American and women employees in hirings, firings, pay, promotions and other terms and conditions of employment; wherefore, Ellis argues that he should be granted permission to vindicate the rights of the many.

  

Dated: June 24, 2013                               By______________________________

                                                                              Walter L. Ellis, pro se   


 HOW SCHNEIDER APPEAR TO MANIPULATE CERTAIN JUDGES

 


No JUSTICE for BLACKS in the CALIFORNIA UNJUST SYSTEM

 

My name is Walter Ellis, an AFRICAN AMERICAN who believe and can confirm that most AFRICAN AMERICANS cannot receive justice especially in San Bernardino and Riverside, the most racist judicial system in CALIFORNIA.

 

My most recent encounter  with “Justice for White’s” began when I was injured 1/13/2009, fired, denied medical treatment, denied protection from the RACIST Fontana PD, denied Workman Compensation by Judge Chris Willmon  all who appear to be in bed with SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIERS, INC., (SNI), www.truckerscomplaint.com  /  http://justiceforblacks.blogspot.com/   http://walter-ellis.blogspot.com/ / http://schneiderdotviolations.blogspot.com/

 

After being injured by SCHNEIDER I was terminated, sued for posting complaints on web site(s). truckerscomplaint.com

 

It has been my contention that when AFRICAN AMERICANS make complaints Federal agencies and the Judicial System most times fail to investigate.

 

 I am a Litigant in Pro-Se being sued by SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIERS INC. for accusations I posted DEFAMATORY statements on my web sites. See:
 
DEFENDANT, IN MITIGATION, ARGUED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW EXACTLY WHAT MATERIAL PLAINTIFF CONSIDERS DEROGATORY....  /  CENTRAL REFRGERATED / SWIFT TRUCKING COMPLAINTS  /   THESE RACIST BASTARDS  

 

 

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL IN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

 

 

WALTER L. ELLIS,

          Defendant and Appellant,

 

                                   vs.

 

SCHNEIDER NATIONAL, INC., et al.,

 

          Plaintiffs and Respondents.

 

 

 

 

 



   

Court of Appeals Case No.: G049501

Superior Court Case No.: CIVDS 906308

 

 

 

 

 

APPELLANT’S SUPPLEMENTAL LETTER BRIEF

 

 

 

                WALTER L. ELLIS, In Pro Per

           


 

Appellant Walter L. Ellis (“Appellant” or “Ellis”) submits this supplemental letter brief in response to the Court’s April 14, 2014 Order inviting the parties to address the questions set forth below.

1.     “Was the statement of damages insufficient to satisfy Code of Civil Procedure section 580's notice requirements, rendering void the judgment awarding compensatory and punitive damages on Schneider National, Inc.'s and Schneider National Carriers, Inc.'s (collectively Schneider) libel cause of action, because it was not served a reasonable time before Ellis's answer was stricken as a terminating sanction?”

 

Appellant argues that Matera v. McLeod (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 44, 60-

62 is on point in this instance based on the fact that Appellant was clearly not given proper notice of the award of compensatory and punitive damages before Appellant’s answer was stricken thereby violating his due process rights. In Matera, the court cited Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co. (1950) 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 wherein it held that the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause generally requires that a person be provided notice and an opportunity to be heard before the government deprives the person of property through adjudication or some other form of individualized determination. The notice must be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. [Citations.] The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information [citation], and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance [citations].”

          In this instance, respondents Schneider National Carriers, Inc. (“Schneider”) and Jeff Ames (collectively “Respondents”) concede the following facts:

·       Respondents sued Appellant after he posted on the internet allegations that Schneider stole millions of dollars in unpaid wages from its own employees and systematically discriminated against African-Americans in the terms and conditions of their employment. [CT 4309-4363].

·       At the time that Respondents filed the complaint against Appellant they did not know whether or not they had suffered any damages; wherefore, the complaint did not state the amount of damages sought.

·       On June 21, 2010, the trial court granted Respondents’ motion for terminating sanctions and struck Appellant’s answer.

·       On October 21, 2010, Respondents filed their statement of damages wherein they requested $130,000 in compensatory damages and $ 560,000 in punitive damages. [CT 3648-3654]. 

A mere inspection of the aforementioned facts suggests that Appellant’s constitutional due process rights were clearly violated because he was not served with the statement of damages prior to his answer being stricken. Respondents argue that they were justified in violating Appellant’s constitutional due process rights on the purported grounds that Respondents did not know that the amount of their damages at the time the complaint was filed. It appears to be lost on Respondents that the mere purpose of Code of Civil Procedure Section 580 was to prevent the type of situation that Appellant has fallen victim to in this instance wherein Appellant was blindsided by an unjustifiably large demand for damages without being given ample time to respond. Appellant argues that this Court should follow Matera and reverse the default judgment that was entered against him.

2.     “Was the statement of damages insufficient to satisfy Code of Civil Procedure section 580's notice requirements, rendering void the judgment awarding compensatory damages on Schneider's libel cause of action, because this was not a personal injury or wrongful death action.”

 

California law provides that where a plaintiff seeks to recover money or

damages, the amount sought generally must be stated in the complaint. (§ 425.10, subd. (a)(2).) There are two exceptions to this rule: (1) “where an action is brought to recover actual or punitive damages for personal injury or wrongful death, the amount demanded shall not be stated” (§ 425.10, subd. (b)); and (2) “[n]o claim for exemplary [i.e., punitive] damages shall state an amount or amounts” (Civ.Code, § 3295, subd. (e)). Appellant argues that the default judgment that was entered against him is void as a matter of law and should be reversed because the action filed against him was not brought to recover actual or punitive damages for personal injury or wrongful death and Respondents failed to prove that they were entitled to any punitive damages.

          It is well settled that “[A] default judgment greater than the amount specifically demanded is void as beyond the trial court's jurisdiction.” (Greenup v. Rodman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 822, 826, 231 Cal.Rptr. 220, 726 P.2d 1295.) Because the complaint in the present case did not seek damages for personal injury or wrongful death, Respondents’ statement of damages fails to provide the formal notice required before Respondents may obtain compensatory damages exceeding the amount requested in the complaint. Appellant argues that Respondents never should have filed this action against Appellant because they did not suffer any damages as a result of his actions and they should not have been allowed to “trump up” damages without giving Appellant proper notice of said damages.

3.     “If the judgment awarding Schneider compensatory and punitive damages on its libel cause of action is void, what is the appropriate remedy on appeal and on remand?”

 

The appropriate remedy on appeal and on remand for Respondents’

maliciously prosecuting this action against Appellate is to issue an order vacating the default judgment and directing the trial court to dismiss this action with prejudice. Appellant also should be granted his costs on appeal.

          Appellant was well within his rights to publish information about Schneider’s rampant Labor Code violations and its discriminatory labor practices on his website. As the Supreme Court has recognized, the Internet is “ ‘the most participatory form of mass speech yet developed’ ” and thus Internet communication is “entitled to ‘the highest protection from governmental intrusion.’ ” (Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union (1997) 521 U.S. 844, 863.) Where, as here, the gravamen of the lawsuit is the content of Appellant’s website, the action arises from an act in furtherance of the right of free speech. (Kronemyer v. Internet Movie Database Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 941, 946–947; see also Barrett v. Rosenthal (2006) 40 Cal.4th 33, 41, fn. 4 and cases cited therein [Web sites accessible to the public are public forums for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute].)

4.     Is there any evidence in the record of Ellis's financial condition that would support the award of $560,000 in punitive damages to Schneider?

 

There is no evidence in the record which suggests that Ellis’s financial

condition would support the award of $560,000 in punitive damages to Schneider. Respondents argue that said award for punitive damages is justified in this instance based on Ellis’s alleged misconduct in regards to the trial court’s discovery orders. Any alleged failure by Ellis to comply with the trial court’s discovery orders was directly related to his medical condition and based on the fact that Ellis timely filed a peremptory challenge against the Honorable George M. Pacheco (“Judge Pacheco”).

Ellis provided overwhelming evidence which proves that he suffers from debilitating mental and physical ailments which has interfered with his ability to defend against this action. [CT 165-425; CT 4589-4654]. The trial court ignored Ellis’s evidence regarding his medical condition and thereby abused its discretion by denying his Motion to Vacate the Default Judgment. [CT 4309-4363] Ellis argues that any reasonable person would have neglected to prosecute an action if their very health was at risk. The test of whether neglect was excusable is whether ‘a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances’ might have made the same error. (See Bettencourt v. Los Rios Community College Dist. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 270, 276.)

Additionally, Ellis filed a timely peremptory challenge against Judge Pacheco wherein Ellis was forced to take a legal position so that he would not waive his right to challenge Judge Pacheco’s jurisdiction over his claims in light of the fact that Judge Pacheco refused to recuse himself from presiding over this matter. [CT 2551-2567] There is no evidence in the record which supports Respondents’ contentions that Ellis acted in bad faith. There is also no evidence in the record which shows that Ellis’s financial condition supports the trial court’s award of punitive damages. Respondents’ assertions that they needed to conduct discovery to determine Ellis’s financial condition is without merit. The mere fact that Schneider employed Ellis and paid him low wages and then injured him on the job wherein Schneider disputed Ellis’s workers’ compensation claim suggests that Respondents were well aware of Ellis’s low socioeconomic status and of the fact that Ellis had no means of paying an award for punitive damages.

CONCLUSION

For all the above reasons, this Court should reverse the default judgment that was entered Appellant and grant him his costs on appeal. This Court should also order that all trial court rulings affected by the void order be reversed.

 

Dated: May 27, 2014                  ______________________________________

     Walter L. Ellis

                                                               Appellant, In Propria Personam

 

Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division Three.

OPINION 

Because we conclude the award of punitive damages must be stricken, we need not consider whether the complete lack of any evidence of Ellis’s financial condition at the time of the default prove-up hearing requires reversal as well.  (Adams v. Murakami (1991) 54 Cal.3d 105, 109 [“an award of punitive damages cannot be sustained on appeal unless the trial record contains meaningful evidence of the defendant’s financial condition” at the time of trial].)
Filed July 11, 2014.
 

 SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIERS LAWSUIT AFTER DRIVER FILED DOT COMPLAINT 

On 1/12/2009 Ellis filed a DOT complaint against SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIER, Inc...  In retaliation SCHNEIDER filed a MALICIOUS LAW SUIT AGAINST Ellis, in the amount of $701,000.00.  Upon appealing Judge Pacheco’s decision the Appeal Court ruled against SCHNEIDER on COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES, LIBEL PER SE; AND INFRIGEMENT AND DILUTION OF SERVICE MARK,  see: Appeal Court “OPINION” 
On 1/13/09 after filing a DOT Complaint,   LUKE took documents, including my log books in the Drivers lunch room. I was later injured (broken rib, and knee injury) by BRANDON while attempting to escape from building. Luke later fired me stating," Walter you are being fired for log book violations and refusing a load on 1/12/09"                 ...............................................

In retaliation for Ellis filing the above DOT complaint against SCHNEIDER, the company on 4/30/2009 filed a MALICIOUS LAW SUIT against Ellis……………………………………………………………
On May 8, 2009 I was served by SCHNEIDER’S Attorney: David S. Binder Tharpe & Howell
15250 Ventura Bl.,    9th Floor,   Sherman Oaks, CA. 91403, TEL.: (818) 205-9955  

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES, LIBEL PER SE; AND INFRIGEMENT AND DILUTION OF SERVICE MARK, UNLAWFUL RECORDINGS OF CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION (Penal Code 632) (SEE LINK BELOW):

SCHNEIDER v ELLIS MALICIOUS LAWSUIT click here to download file

On 1/12/2009 Ellis filed a DOT complaint against SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIER, Inc. In retaliation SCHNEIDER filed a MALICIOUS LAW SUIT AGAINST Ellis, in the amount of $701,000.00.  Upon appealing Judge Pacheco's decision the Appeal Court ruled against SCHNEIDER on COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES, LIBEL PER SE; AND INFRIGEMENT AND DILUTION OF SERVICE MARK, see: Appeal Court "OPINION"   
 
                                SCHNEIDER NATIONAL, INC. v. ELLIS No. G049501.

SCHNEIDER NATIONAL, INC., et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. WALTER L. ELLIS, Defendant and Appellant.

Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division Three.
Filed July 11, 2014.
 

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA


MORRIS BICKLEY, MICHAEL

  D. PATTON, RAYMOND GREW,

DENNIS VAN HORN and          DOUGLAS PUMRO I ,

Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

 

SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIERS, INC., and DOES

1-10, inclusive,

 

                       Defendants

 

        

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

.

 

Superior Court Case No.:CIVDS906308


                                vs.

 

             Walter Ellis 

 

                   Plantiff

 


CASE NO.: 08-CV-05806-JSW

NOTICE OF LIEN_REOUEST TO BE PLACED ON PROOF OF SERVICE LIST FOR ALL PLEADINGS AND DISCOVERY


 

 

Case4:08-cv-05806-JSW     Document97                                                FiledOB/25/11  Page2 of

TO PLAINTIFF WALTER L. ELLIS AND HIS ATTORNEY OF RECORD: YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, ARE HEREBY NOTICED that SCHNEIDER

NATIONAL, INC., SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIERS, INC. and JEFF AMES

hereby claim a lien of first priority upon any settlement or judgment rendered in favor of the Plaintiff for amounts payable pursuant to the following Orders for Discovery  Sanctions  in  the  amounts  of  $2,400.00  and  $7,876.50  (totaling

$10,276.50) against WALTER L. ELLIS ("ELLIS") in the matter of Schneider National, Inc. et al. v. Ellis, Case Number CIVDS906308, which is pending before the State of California Superior Court, County of San Bernardino:

                March 16, 2010                Court-ordered discovery sanctions in the amount of

$2,400.00 against ELLIS for his failure to provide

 

 

        July 13,2010


$6,236.00 against ELLIS for his disobedience of a prior Court Order to provide further responses to written discovery.

Court-ordered discovery sanctions in the amount of $1,640.50 against ELLIS for his disobedience of a prior Court Order compelling his deposition.

 

NOTICE OF LIEN and REQUEST TO BE PLACED ON PROOF OF SERVICE LIST FOR ALL PLEADINGS AND DISCOVERY

 

Case 2:11-cv-08557-CAS-DTB Document 430-1 Filed 08/30/13 Page 1 of 27 Page ID

#:9898

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CAIFORNIA EASTERN DIVISION

Case No. CV 11-08557 CAS (DTBx)

SCHNEIDER LOGISTICS TRANSLOADING AND DISTRIBUTION, INC.’S SEPARATE STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Hearing Date: November 4, 2013

 

TO PLAINTIFFS AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

Defendant Schneider Logistics Transloading and Distribution, Inc. hereby submits the following Separate Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and supporting evidence in support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

SEPARATE STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED MATERIAL FACTS

AND SUPPORTING EVIDENCE

 

STATEMENT OF CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Plaintiffs’ claims against SLTD fail as a matter of law because Plaintiffs

cannot establish that SLTD is a joint employer with Impact under California law.

Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal.4th 35 (2010); Futrell v. Payday Cal., Inc., 190

Cal.App.4th 419 (2010).

2. Plaintiffs’ claims against SLTD fail as a matter of law because Plaintiffs

cannot establish that SLTD is a joint employer with Impact under Fair Labor

Standards Act. Bonnette v. California Health and Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465

(9th Cir. 1983); Moreau v. Air France, 356 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2004); Maddock v. KB

Homes, Inc., 631 F.Supp.2d 1226 (C.D. Cal. 2007).

3. Plaintiffs’ claims against SLTD fail as a matter of law because Plaintiffs

cannot establish that SLTD is a joint employer with Premier under California law.

Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal.4th 35 (2010); Futrell v. Payday Cal., Inc., 190

Cal.App.4th 419 (2010).

4. Plaintiffs’ claims against SLTD fail as a matter of law because Plaintiffs

cannot establish that SLTD is a joint employer with Premier under the Fair Labor

Standards Act. Bonnette v. California Health and Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465

(9th Cir. 1983); Moreau v. Air France, 356 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2004); Maddock v. KB Homes, Inc., 631 F.Supp.2d 1226 (C.D. Cal. 2007).

DATED: August 30, 2013 OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK

& STEWART, P.C.  By: /s/ Douglas J. Farmer  Attorneys for Defendant SCHNEIDER LOGISTICS TRANSLOADING AND DISTRIBUTION, INC.

Case 2:11-cv-08557-CAS-DTB Document 430-1 Filed 08/30/13 Page 27 of 27 Page ID

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06/27/2013

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OBJECTOR AND INTERVENOR RANDALL PITTMEN'S NOTICE OF JOINDER TO WALTER ELLIS'S OBJECTIONS TO CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT 117 filed by Intervenor Randall Pittman.(shb) (Entered: 07/01/2013)

 

INTRODUCTION

          On June 24, 2013, Objector and Intervenor Walter Ellis (“Ellis”) filed his objections to the class action settlement agreement (“the Agreement”) that was entered into between, the Plaintiffs on the one hand and, the Defendants on the other hand, in this action. On July 3, 2013, this Court issued an order (“the Order”) requiring Ellis to file a supplemental brief indicating his dates of employment with Defendants.

In reply to the Order, Ellis argues that he should be granted permission to intervene in this action for three reasons. First, Ellis argues that a PAGA action is an enforcement action and not a class action.

 

III.     LEGAL Argument:       A PAGA Action is an Enforcement Action and Not a Class Action

          Defendants contend that Ellis has no standing to object to the Agreement based on the fact that Ellis is not a class member in this action based on the fact that he never worked for Defendants as a mechanic. Ellis concedes that during the relevant time period he worked for Defendants as a truck driver and not as a mechanic; however, because this is a PAGA action Ellis argues that he has standing to intervene in this action on behalf of the LWDA. The California Supreme Court has ruled that a PAGA action is in the nature of an enforcement action and is not a class action. (See Arias v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 4th 969, 975 (2009).) The PAGA was adopted to empower aggrieved employees to act as private attorneys general and to authorize them to seek civil penalties for Labor Code violations that previously could be assessed only by state agencies. (Dunlap v. Superior Court (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 330, 336).

   The Class Members Will be Prejudiced Should Ellis be Denied the Right to Intervene in This Action

          Ellis argues that the class members in this action will be prejudiced should this Court deny him the right to intervene in this action. Ellis has objected to the Agreement for the purpose of increasing the amount of wages paid to the class members and to increase the amount of the PAGA penalties allocated to the LWDA. Ellis argues that the class members will benefit from an increased PAGA payment based on the fact that the LWDA will use said funds for the benefit of all California workers. The PAGA statute provides that 75 percent of PAGA penalties collected by an “aggrieved employee” must be paid to the LWDA. (See Labor Code § 2699(i))

          Ellis further argues that by intervening in this action he is not requesting that the conceded wages owed to the class members be delayed; however, he is requesting that this Court not approve the PAGA penalties and the attorneys’ fees requested in this action. Under California law, an employer must pay an employee any conceded wages owed and without condition. (See Labor Code Labor Code § 206.5) The evidence suggests that class counsel and Defendants counsel have colluded with each other to enter a settlement agreement that only benefits them. The attorneys fees requested in this action are clearly not warranted.

Ellis further argues that by intervening in this action he is not requesting that the conceded wages owed to the class members be delayed; however, he is requesting that this Court not approve the PAGA penalties and the attorneys’ fees requested in this action. Under California law, an employer must pay an employee any conceded wages owed and without condition. (See Labor Code Labor Code § 206.5) The evidence suggests that class counsel and Defendants counsel have colluded with each other to enter a settlement agreement that only benefits them. The attorneys fees requested in this action are clearly not warranted. In

determining what fees are reasonable, a district court may consider a lawyer’s misconduct, which affects the value of the lawyer’s services. (See Image Technical, 136 F.3d at 1358. A court has broad equitable power to deny attorneys’ fees (or to require an attorney to disgorge fees already received) when an attorney represents clients with conflicting interests. (See Silbiger v. Prudence Bonds Corp., 180 F.2d 917, 920 (2d Cir. 1950).) This Court should allow Ellis and Pittman to shine a light on the fraud that was committed in this action thereby protecting the unnamed class members from imminent harm.

 IV.    CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Ellis respectfully requests that this Court accept his objections to the Agreement and grant him permission to intervene in this action pursuant to the PAG Act.  Dated: July 13, 2013      Walter L. Ellis, Pro Se