CENTRAL REFRIGERATED SERVICES Inc. is being
sued for “FRUAD”
Dear Current and Former Central Refrigerated
Services, Inc. Employees:
Please be informed that a wage and hour lawsuit has been filed
against Central Refrigerated Services, Inc. in the Central District Court pursuant to the Private Attorneys General
Act wherein Central Refrigerated is liable to the State of California for millions of dollars in civil penalties.
You may be entitled to unpaid wages as a direct of this lawsuit. Please contact me at this phone number if you believe
that you are owed wages as a result of Central Refrigerated unfair labor practices.
Ellis firstname.lastname@example.org Phone # 951 471-8686
Doctrine of Unconscionability
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR
ANDRE WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent;
PINKERTON GOVERNMENTAL SERVICES, INC., Real Party in Interest. B261007 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No.
BC497309) ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate. William F. Highberger, Judge.
Let a writ of mandate
issue directing the superior court to (1) vacate its October 31, 2014, order granting real party in interest Pinkerton’s
request for alternative relief, and (2) enter a new order denying Pinkerton’s motion to compel contractual arbitration
in its entirety. The alternative writ, having served its purpose, is discharged. Petitioner is entitled to his costs in this
writ proceeding, see: http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B261007.PDF
The doctrine of unconscionability
allows courts to invalidate adhesive arbitration agreements with unfair terms. For example, a defendant cannot require plaintiffs
to arbitrate in another state, to shoulder exorbitant upfront arbitration fees or pay all arbitration costs if the plaintiff
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE
RACHEL VERDUGO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v .
ALLIANTGROUP, L.P., Defendant and Respondent. G049139 (Super. Ct. No. 30-2013-00643612)
P I N I O N
Appeal from an order of the
Superior Court of Orange County, Gail Andrea Andler, Judge. Reversed.
Plaintiff and appellant Rachel Verdugo appeals from an order granting a motion to stay this wage and
hour lawsuit based on a forum selection clause in her employment agreement with defendant and respondent Alliantgroup, L.P.
(Alliantgroup). The clause designates Harris County, Texas, as the exclusive forum for any dispute arising out of Verdugo’s
employment, and also includes a provision designating Texas law as governing all disputes. Verdugo contends the trial court
erred because enforcing the forum selection clause and related choice-of-law clause violates California’s public policy
on employee compensation. We agree and reverse the trial court’s order. Because we conclude the forum selection clause
is unenforceable as against public policy, we do not address Verdugo’s numerous other challenges to the clause.
DISPOSITION: The order is reversed. Verdugo shall recover her costs on appeal.
by: Walter Ellis email@example.com June
SWEENEY ADVISED THAT I COULD NOT INCLUDE MY PAGA
CLAIMS IN THIS ARBITRATION. THIS IS APPARENTLY NOT TRUE, see: http://www.privateattorneygeneral.com/paga_law.html
The Supreme Court resolved the question of whether state legislatures can enact statutes
to invalidate arbitration agreements. Last year the Court granted certiorari, vacated and remanded the California Supreme Court's
decision in Sonic-Calabasas
v. Moreno in light of Concepcion. In Sonic-Calabasas, an employer signed an arbitration
agreement as a condition of employment. Under the California
employees with claims for unpaid wages are entitled to an administrative hearing with the California Division of Labor Standards
pursuant to Section
98 et seq. After the employee left his position, he filed a
claim with the labor commissioner for unpaid vacation pay. In response, the defendant moved to compel arbitration pursuant
to its agreement with the employee. The California Supreme Court held as a matter of public
policy that arbitration agreements "cannot be made to serve as a vehicle for the waiver of [state] statutory rights."
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the California Supreme Court for reconsideration.
Posted by Walter Ellis firstname.lastname@example.org June 15, 2015
STATE OF CALIFORNIA LABOR and WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT AGENCY
June 24, 2011
Sepulveda Blvd., Sherman Oaks, CA
RE: Employer: Central Refrigerated Services, Inc.
Randall Pittman, Walter Ellis, et al.
RE: LWDA No:
is to inform you that the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) received your notice of alleged Labor Code violations pursuant to Labor Code Section 2699, postmarked May 27,
2011, and after review, does not intend to
investigate the allegations.
a reminder to you, the provisions of Labor
Code Section 2699(i) provides that “…civil penalties
recovered by aggrieved employees shall be distributed
as follows: 75 percent to the LWDA for enforcement of labor laws and education
of employers and employees about
their rights and responsibilities under this code.” Labor Code Section
2699(l) specifies “[T]he superior court shall review and
approve any penalties sought as part of a proposed settlement agreement
pursuant to this part.”
Consequently, you must advise us of the results of the litigation, and forward a copy of
the court judgment or the court-approved settlement agreement. Please be certain
to reference the above LWDA assigned Case Number in any future correspondence.
Refrigerated Services, Inc.
5175 West 2100 South West Valley
City, UT 84120
Lake Elsinore, CA
CENTRAL's Attorney stated that by my being in Pro Per it will make it very difficult for me
to get any monetary relief other than maybe
$500.00. The Attorney stated he is willing to forward the $500.00 offer to CENTRAL for their possible approval.
aside, the case of Lederman v. Prudential, A-1449-04T5, could add to the long-running debate between
plaintiffs lawyers and corporations over confidential arbitrations. The question this time: Are ADR agreements that
cover large numbers of employees’ enforceable if the workers claim that their own lawyers conspired with the
corporation to limit recoveries and enrich the lawyers?
It appears that the Fraudulent complaint that was filed
by GETMAN SWENNEY on my behalf (an AFRICAN AMERICAN), and many other Plaintiffs mostly CACASIANS was filed within the 4yr
statute of limitations. I am now being told by CENTRAL’S Attorney that the 4yr statute of limitations does not apply to me. He stated my being in Pro Per will make it very difficult for me to get any monetary relief other than maybe $500.00. The Attorney stated he is willing to forward the
$500.00 offer to CENTRAL for their possible approval.
While the FAA preempts state law, Section 2 — "the savings clause" — allows plaintiffs to challenge arbitration agreements based on common law contract defenses
such as duress, fraud,
WALTER L. ELLIS, Pro Se
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT for the CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA (Eastern Division - Riverside)
GABRIEL CILLUFFO, KEVIN
Case No. EDCV 12-00886 VAP (OPx)
RATTERREE individually and
behalf of all other
SERVICES, INC., CENTRAL
LEASING, INC., JON
ELLIS’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO INTERVENE PURSUANT TO FRCP, RULE 24; MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
[Declaration of Walter Ellis and Proposed
in Intervention filed
Date: February 23, 2015
Judge: Hon. Virginia A. Phillips
ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”), Rule 24 on February 23, 2015, at 2:00 p.m., in Courtroom 2 of the above-entitled
Court, located at 3470 Twelfth Street, Riverside, CA 92501, intervenor Walter L. Ellis (“Ellis”) will move to
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 5:12-cv-00886-VAP-OP intervene in this action pursuant to the Private Attorneys General Act. A true
and correct copy of Ellis’s proposed complaint in intervention is attached hereto as Exhibit “1”.
January 15, 2015 By_______/s/ Walter L. Ellis______
L. Ellis, Pro Se
For info regarding MOTION to INTERVENE, click on link below:
CENTRAL REFRIDGERATED MOTION TO INTERVENE
For info regarding INTERVENTION COMPLAINT, see link below:
CENTRAL REFRIDGERATED INTERVENTION COMPLAINT
For more info regarding lawsuits against CENTRAL
REFRIGERATED Inc, see links below
CENTRAL REFRIGERATED SERVICES, INC
Ellis further argues that he has standing to intervene in this action in order to protect the interests
of the LWDA, hundreds of unnamed “aggrieved employees” and the general public. The PAGA
was enacted to empower aggrieved employees to act as private attorneys general and to authorize them to seek civil penalties
for Labor Code violations that previously could be assessed only by state agencies. (Dunlap v. Superior Court (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th
330, 336). Ellis further argues that he has the right to collect civil penalties based on the same Labor Code violations alleged
in this class action.
Labor Code 2699(a) specifically states “Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, any provision of this code that provides for a civil penalty to be assessed and collected by the Labor
and Workforce Development Agency or any of its departments, divisions, commissions, boards, agencies, or employees,
for a violation of this code, may, as an alternative, be recovered through a civil action brought by an aggrieved employee
on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former employees pursuant to the procedures specified in Section 2699.3.”
California Supreme Court ruled in Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 984 (Arias) that a PAGA
action was in the nature of an enforcement act and not a class action; wherefore, Ellis argues that he has a right to collect
civil penalties on behalf of the LWDA in addition to the unpaid wages that are being sought on behalf
of the class members in this action.
Ellis argues that although he is participating in the related
arbitration proceedings, he is not prevented from seeking civil penalties in this action.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE Intervenors pray for relief as follows:
more fully set forth in the individual causes of action:
For civil penalties under Labor Code §
2698 et seq.;
For such other and further relief as the court deems just and proper;
prejudgment and post-judgment interest, according to proof;
For injunctive relief, including reinstatement
For punitive damages;
DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
BICKLEY, MICHAEL D.
CLASS ACTION (FRCP 23)
NOTICE OF RECENT DECISION IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION
Plaintiffs, v. TO
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIERS, INC.,
10/03/2014 229 ORDER SCHEDULING TRIAL AND PRETRIAL MATTERS. Signed by Judge JEFFREY S.
WHITE on 10/3/14. (jjoS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 10/3/2014) (Entered: 10/03/2014)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MORRIS BICKLEY, et al.,
SCHNEIDER NATIONAL, INC., et al.,
Case No. 08-cv-05806-JSW
ORDER SCHEDULING TRIAL AND PRETRIAL MATTERS
Following the Case Management Conference held
on September 26, 2014, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that the Case Management Statement is adopted, except as expressly modified
Order. It is further ORDERED that:
Jury Trial Date: Monday, January 11, 2016 at 8:00 a.m.,
Jury Selection: Wednesday, January 6, 2016 at 8:00 a.m.
Pretrial Conference: Monday, December 7, 2015 at 2:00 p.m.
Last Day to Hear Dispositive Motions: Friday, September 11, 2015 at 9:00 A.M.
Last Day for Expert Discovery: August
Close of ALL Discovery: August 31, 2015
The parties are reminded that a failure voluntarily
to disclose information pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) or to supplement disclosures or discovery
OBJECTOR AND INTERVENOR WALTER ELLIS’S OBJECTIONS TO CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
L. ELLIS, Pro Se E-mail:
STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
ALAN KRUMBINE, an individual, et.
al.; on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated,
SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIERS, INC., a Nevada Corporation,
Case No.: 10-CV-4565-GHK (JEMx)
OBJECTOR AND INTERVENOR WALTER ELLIS’S OBJECTIONS
TO CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
Date Filed: June
COURT AND ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant
to the Class Action Notice (“the Notice”) mailed to the class members in the above-entitled action, objector and
intervenor Walter L. Ellis (“Ellis”) hereby objects to the final approval of the class action settlement agreement
(“the Agreement”) on numerous grounds.
PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE
that Ellis will appear and object to the final approval of the class action settlement at the class action fairness hearing
currently set to be heard on August 5, 2013.
PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that Ellis intends
to file a motion to intervene in this action pursuant to the Private Attorneys General Act and he also intends to file a motion
to decertify this class action.
Dated: June 24, 2013
Walter L. Ellis, Pro Se
OBJECTIONS TO CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
Ellis hereby objects to the Agreement that was entered into in the above-entitled action between the plaintiffs, on
the one hand, and the defendants on the other hand. Ellis objects to the Agreement on the following grounds:
First, Ellis objects to the Agreement on the grounds that it does not appear to be fair or adequate. The
evidence suggests that there are hundreds of class members who are covered by the Agreement; however, the settlement amount
is only $3,500,000 which suggests that the each class member will receive only a miniscule amount from the settlement. Defendants
are very profitable companies; wherefore, it does not appear that the punishment fits the crime in this instance. Ellis argues
that the settlement amount should be sufficient enough to deter other companies from engaging in similar conduct.
Second, Ellis objects to the settlement on the grounds that this action should be expanded to include additional
causes of action. The evidence suggests that Defendants intentionally stole wages from Ellis and thousands of other aggrieved
employees over a long period of time; wherefore, Defendants should be held liable for their wrongful acts. Additionally, Ellis
argues that Defendants have a well-documented history of retaliating against employees who complain about their working conditions;
wherefore, Ellis argues that this action should be expanded to include a cause of action for retaliation. Ellis further argues
that this action should be expanded to include causes of action for theft and conversion of labor, fraud and deceit, conspiracy
to commit fraud, violation of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act and violations of Labor Code sections 98.6,
216, 223, 232.5 and 1102.5.
Third, Ellis argues that the class should be expanded
to include additional “aggrieved employees” pursuant to the PAG Act. In and around 2004, the California Legislature
signed into law the PAG Act which provides that an “aggrieved employee” can file a lawsuit against an employer
for any violation of the Labor Code and the other “aggrieved employees” can then benefit from a judgment entered
against said employer. Ellis argues that this action should be expanded to include all “aggrieved employees” and
applicants who were affected by Defendants’ Labor Code violations throughout the State of California and not just the
class as defined in this lawsuit.
Fourth, Ellis objects to the Agreement on the
grounds that the release is overly broad. The Agreement requires that the class members release claims that were never actually
litigated in this action including, but not limited to, claims for race and gender discrimination. Additionally, the Agreement
requires that the named plaintiffs release their individual claims when said claims were never actually litigated in this
action. The named plaintiffs should not be punished for acting as class representatives. The Agreement specifically states
that the class members are required to release all claims that “were asserted or reasonably could have been asserted
in this Action”. Ellis argues that said language is overly broad and the Agreement should be revised to notify the class
members that they have a right to pursue other claims against Defendants that were not explicitly released by the Agreement.
Fifth, Ellis objects to the Agreement on the grounds that the PAGA payment is insufficient and
should be increased to $5,000,000. The Agreement provides that the PAGA payment will not exceed five percent of the total
settlement amount which Ellis believes is insufficient to deter Defendants from further violating the Labor Code. Ellis argues
that based on the facts alleged in this complaint, the PAGA penalties alone should be in excess of $25,000,000. The class
attorneys have not sufficiently justified the enormous discount on the PAGA penalties; wherefore, Ellis argues that this Court
should not approve the Agreement because the PAGA payment is insufficient and does not serve the goal and purpose of the PAGA
Sixth, Ellis objects to the settlement on the grounds that
the PAGA claims should not have been certified as a class action. The California Legislature enacted the PAG Act for the benefit
of all California workers and not just a certain “class” of workers. (See Labor Code §§ 2698 et seq.)
Additionally, the California Supreme Court ruled that a PAGA action is an enforcement action and need not be certified as
a class action. (See Arias v. Superior Court (Angelo Dairy), 46 Cal.4th 969, 209 P.3d 923, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 (2009).)
Ellis further argues that class counsel cannot prove that a class action is superior to a representative PAGA action; wherefore,
Ellis argues that this Court should not approve the Agreement.
Seventh, Ellis objects to the Agreement on the grounds that the attorneys’ fee award is excessive. The Agreement
provides that the class counsel will receive 33 percent of the gross settlement fund; however, the lack of complexity and
the shortness of duration of this litigation clearly do not warrant attorneys’ fees in excess of a million dollars.
Additionally, lead attorneys Lee Gordon (“Gordon”) and Daniel Chaleff (“Chaleff”) spent 1591 and 431
hours, respectively, litigating this action and their assistants only spent a fraction of said time litigating this action.
The evidence suggests that Gordon and Chaleff billed the class members for work that could have been performed by lesser paid
assistants thereby defrauding the class members out of hundreds of thousands of dollars in attorneys’ fees. Ellis argues
that this Court should not just “rubber stamp” the attorneys’ fee award requested in this action. This Court
should require Gordon and Chaleff to explain why they spent more time litigating this action than their assistants in clear
contradiction to well-known law firm practices.
Eighth, Ellis objects to the
Agreement on the grounds that the class members were not given an opportunity to conduct discovery to determine the adequacy
of the settlement that was reached in this action. The class members should be allowed to review Defendants’ financial
statements in order to determine if the settlement is fair and adequate. The parties have not adequately explained why the
settlement amount should not be considerably more. Ellis argues that he should be given permission to contact the other class
members to discuss the fairness of the Agreement without interference from the Defendants or from class counsel.
Ninth, Ellis objects to the Agreement on the grounds that there appears to be fraud and collusion between
Plaintiffs’ counsel and Defendants’ counsel. Defendants agreed to pay Plaintiffs’ counsel over $1,000,000
in attorneys’ fees; however, Plaintiffs’ counsel failed to ensure that the class members were adequately compensated
for the injuries that they have sustained. Ellis hereby objects to the award of attorneys’ fees in this action. Additionally,
it appears that Plaintiffs’ attorneys and Defendants’ attorneys colluded with each other to discount the PAGA
claims without justification.
Finally, Ellis objects to the Agreement on the
grounds that the class members should be given an opportunity to select different class counsel to represent them in this
action. Ellis has received credible evidence which suggests that the class counsel appointed in this action have failed to
adequately represent the class members in other class actions that they have participated in.
REQUEST FOR LEAVE OF COURT TO FILE COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION
Should this Court approve the Agreement over Ellis’s objections, Ellis hereby requests that this Court
grant him leave of Court to file a complaint in intervention. Ellis argues that he has exhausted his administrative remedies
with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”) and with the Labor and Workforce Development Agency
(“LWDA”) wherefore he has standing to pursue additional claims against Defendants. Ellis argues that thousands
of current and former employees and applicants of Defendants will likely benefit from this action should this Court grant
his request for leave of Court to file a complaint in intervention.
Ellis further argues that Defendants
will not be prejudiced should this Court grant his request for leave of Court to file a complaint in intervention because
Defendants have known about his claims for several years and have had ample to prepare a defense to said claims. Ellis has
reason to believe that Defendants continue to discriminate against African-American and women employees in hirings, firings,
pay, promotions and other terms and conditions of employment; wherefore, Ellis argues that he should be granted permission
to vindicate the rights of the many.
Dated: June 24, 2013
Walter L. Ellis, pro se
HOW SCHNEIDER APPEAR TO MANIPULATE CERTAIN JUDGES
No JUSTICE for BLACKS in the CALIFORNIA UNJUST SYSTEM
My name is Walter Ellis, an AFRICAN AMERICAN who
believe and can confirm that most AFRICAN AMERICANS cannot receive justice especially in San Bernardino and Riverside, the
most racist judicial system in CALIFORNIA.
My most recent encounter with “Justice for White’s”
began when I was injured 1/13/2009, fired, denied medical treatment, denied protection from the RACIST Fontana PD, denied
Workman Compensation by Judge Chris Willmon all who appear to be in bed with SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIERS, INC.,
(SNI), www.truckerscomplaint.com / http://justiceforblacks.blogspot.com/ http://walter-ellis.blogspot.com/ / http://schneiderdotviolations.blogspot.com/
After being injured by SCHNEIDER I was terminated, sued for posting complaints on
web site(s). truckerscomplaint.com
It has been my contention
that when AFRICAN AMERICANS make complaints Federal agencies and the Judicial System most times fail to investigate.
I am a Litigant in Pro-Se being sued by SCHNEIDER
NATIONAL CARRIERS INC. for accusations I posted DEFAMATORY statements
on my web sites. See:
IN MITIGATION, ARGUED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW EXACTLY WHAT MATERIAL PLAINTIFF CONSIDERS DEROGATORY.... / CENTRAL
REFRGERATED / SWIFT TRUCKING COMPLAINTS / THESE
Court of Appeals of California, Fourth
District, Division Three.
Because we conclude the award of punitive
damages must be stricken, we need not consider whether the complete lack of any evidence of Ellis’s financial condition
at the time of the default prove-up hearing requires reversal as well. (Adams v. Murakami (1991) 54 Cal.3d 105, 109 [“an award
of punitive damages cannot be sustained on appeal unless the trial record contains meaningful evidence of the defendant’s
financial condition” at the time of trial].)
Filed July 11, 2014.
SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIERS LAWSUIT AFTER
DRIVER FILED DOT COMPLAINT
On 1/12/2009 Ellis filed a DOT complaint
against SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIER, Inc... In retaliation SCHNEIDER filed a MALICIOUS LAW SUIT AGAINST Ellis, in the
amount of $701,000.00. Upon appealing Judge Pacheco’s decision the Appeal Court ruled against SCHNEIDER on COMPLAINT
FOR DAMAGES, LIBEL PER SE; AND INFRIGEMENT AND DILUTION OF SERVICE MARK, see: Appeal Court “OPINION”
On 1/13/09 after filing a DOT Complaint, LUKE took documents, including my log books in the Drivers lunch
room. I was later injured (broken rib, and knee injury) by BRANDON while attempting to escape from building. Luke later fired
me stating," Walter you are being fired for log book violations and refusing a load on 1/12/09"
In retaliation for Ellis
filing the above DOT complaint against SCHNEIDER, the company on 4/30/2009 filed a MALICIOUS LAW SUIT against Ellis……………………………………………………………
On May 8, 2009 I was served by SCHNEIDER’S Attorney: David S. Binder Tharpe & Howell
15250 Ventura Bl.,
9th Floor, Sherman Oaks, CA. 91403, TEL.: (818) 205-9955
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES, LIBEL PER SE; AND INFRIGEMENT AND DILUTION OF SERVICE MARK, UNLAWFUL RECORDINGS
OF CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION (Penal Code 632) (SEE LINK BELOW):
SCHNEIDER v ELLIS MALICIOUS LAWSUIT click here to download file
On 1/12/2009 Ellis filed a DOT complaint against SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIER,
Inc. In retaliation SCHNEIDER filed a MALICIOUS LAW SUIT AGAINST Ellis, in the amount of $701,000.00. Upon appealing
Judge Pacheco's decision the Appeal Court ruled against SCHNEIDER on COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES, LIBEL PER SE;
AND INFRIGEMENT AND DILUTION OF SERVICE MARK, see: Appeal Court "OPINION"
SCHNEIDER NATIONAL, INC. v. ELLIS No. G049501.
SCHNEIDER NATIONAL, INC., et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. WALTER L. ELLIS, Defendant and Appellant.
Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District,
Filed July 11, 2014.
FiledOB/25/11 Page2 of
WALTER L. ELLIS AND HIS ATTORNEY OF RECORD: YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, ARE
HEREBY NOTICED that SCHNEIDER
NATIONAL, INC., SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIERS, INC. and JEFF AMES
claim a lien of first priority upon any
settlement or judgment rendered in favor of the Plaintiff for amounts payable pursuant to the following Orders for Discovery Sanctions
$10,276.50) against WALTER L. ELLIS ("ELLIS") in the matter
of Schneider National,
Inc. et al. v. Ellis, Case Number CIVDS906308, which is pending before the State of California Superior
Court, County of San Bernardino:
Court-ordered discovery sanctions in the
$2,400.00 against ELLIS for his failure to provide
$6,236.00 against ELLIS for his disobedience of a prior Court Order to provide further responses to written discovery.
Court-ordered discovery sanctions in the
amount of $1,640.50 against ELLIS for his disobedience of a prior Court
Order compelling his deposition.
NOTICE OF LIEN and REQUEST TO BE PLACED ON
PROOF OF SERVICE LIST FOR ALL
PLEADINGS AND DISCOVERY
Case 2:11-cv-08557-CAS-DTB Document 430-1 Filed 08/30/13 Page 1 of 27 Page ID
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CAIFORNIA EASTERN DIVISION
Case No. CV 11-08557 CAS (DTBx)
SCHNEIDER LOGISTICS TRANSLOADING
AND DISTRIBUTION, INC.’S SEPARATE STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Hearing Date: November 4, 2013
TO PLAINTIFFS AND THEIR ATTORNEYS
Defendant Schneider Logistics Transloading and Distribution, Inc. hereby submits the following Separate
Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and supporting evidence in support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
SEPARATE STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED
STATEMENT OF CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Plaintiffs’ claims against SLTD fail as a matter of law
cannot establish that SLTD is a joint employer with Impact under California law.
Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal.4th 35 (2010); Futrell v. Payday Cal., Inc.,
Plaintiffs’ claims against SLTD fail as a matter of law because Plaintiffs
cannot establish that SLTD is a joint employer with
Impact under Fair Labor
Standards Act. Bonnette v. California Health and Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465
(9th Cir. 1983);
Moreau v. Air France, 356 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2004); Maddock v. KB
Homes, Inc., 631 F.Supp.2d 1226 (C.D.
3. Plaintiffs’ claims against SLTD fail as a matter of law because Plaintiffs
that SLTD is a joint employer with Premier under California law.
Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal.4th 35 (2010); Futrell v.
Payday Cal., Inc., 190
Cal.App.4th 419 (2010).
4. Plaintiffs’ claims against SLTD fail as a matter of law because
cannot establish that SLTD is a joint employer with Premier under the Fair Labor
Standards Act. Bonnette
v. California Health and Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465
(9th Cir. 1983); Moreau v. Air France, 356
F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2004); Maddock v. KB Homes, Inc., 631 F.Supp.2d 1226 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
DATED: August 30,
2013 OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK
& STEWART, P.C. By: /s/ Douglas J. Farmer
for Defendant SCHNEIDER LOGISTICS TRANSLOADING AND DISTRIBUTION, INC.
Case 2:11-cv-08557-CAS-DTB Document 430-1 Filed 08/30/13 Page 27 of 27 Page ID
24, 2013, Objector and Intervenor Walter Ellis (“Ellis”) filed his objections to the class action settlement agreement
(“the Agreement”) that was entered into between, the Plaintiffs on the one hand and, the Defendants on the other
hand, in this action. On July 3, 2013, this Court issued an order (“the Order”) requiring Ellis to file a supplemental
brief indicating his dates of employment with Defendants.
In reply to the Order, Ellis argues that he should be granted
permission to intervene in this action for three reasons. First, Ellis argues that a PAGA action is an enforcement action
and not a class action.
III. LEGAL Argument: A PAGA Action
is an Enforcement Action and Not a Class Action
Defendants contend that Ellis has no standing to object to the Agreement based on the fact that Ellis is not a class member
in this action based on the fact that he never worked for Defendants as a mechanic. Ellis concedes that during the relevant
time period he worked for Defendants as a truck driver and not as a mechanic; however, because this is a PAGA action Ellis
argues that he has standing to intervene in this action on behalf of the LWDA. The California Supreme Court has ruled that
a PAGA action is in the nature of an enforcement action and is not a class action. (See Arias v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 4th
969, 975 (2009).) The PAGA was adopted to empower aggrieved employees to act as private attorneys general and to authorize
them to seek civil penalties for Labor Code violations that previously could be assessed only by state agencies. (Dunlap v.
Superior Court (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 330, 336).
The Class Members Will be Prejudiced Should Ellis be Denied the Right to Intervene in This Action
Ellis argues that the class members in this action will be prejudiced should this Court deny him the right to intervene in
this action. Ellis has objected to the Agreement for the purpose of increasing the amount of wages paid to the class members
and to increase the amount of the PAGA penalties allocated to the LWDA. Ellis argues that the class members will benefit from
an increased PAGA payment based on the fact that the LWDA will use said funds for the benefit of all California workers. The
PAGA statute provides that 75 percent of PAGA penalties collected by an “aggrieved employee” must be paid to the
LWDA. (See Labor Code § 2699(i))
Ellis further argues that by intervening
in this action he is not requesting that the conceded wages owed to the class members be delayed; however, he is requesting
that this Court not approve the PAGA penalties and the attorneys’ fees requested in this action. Under California law,
an employer must pay an employee any conceded wages owed and without condition. (See Labor Code Labor Code § 206.5) The
evidence suggests that class counsel and Defendants counsel have colluded with each other to enter a settlement agreement
that only benefits them. The attorneys fees requested in this action are clearly not warranted.
Ellis further argues that by intervening in this action he is not requesting that the
conceded wages owed to the class members be delayed; however, he is requesting that this Court not approve the PAGA penalties
and the attorneys’ fees requested in this action. Under California law, an employer must pay an employee any conceded
wages owed and without condition. (See Labor Code Labor Code § 206.5) The evidence suggests that class counsel and Defendants
counsel have colluded with each other to enter a settlement agreement that only benefits them. The attorneys fees requested
in this action are clearly not warranted. In
determining what fees are reasonable, a district court may consider a
lawyer’s misconduct, which affects the value of the lawyer’s services. (See Image Technical, 136 F.3d at 1358.
A court has broad equitable power to deny attorneys’ fees (or to require an attorney to disgorge fees already received)
when an attorney represents clients with conflicting interests. (See Silbiger v. Prudence Bonds Corp., 180 F.2d 917, 920 (2d
Cir. 1950).) This Court should allow Ellis and Pittman to shine a light on the fraud that was committed in this action thereby
protecting the unnamed class members from imminent harm.
Based on the foregoing, Ellis respectfully requests that this Court accept his objections to the Agreement
and grant him permission to intervene in this action pursuant to the PAG Act. Dated:
July 13, 2013 Walter L. Ellis, Pro Se