DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
BICKLEY, MICHAEL D.
CLASS ACTION (FRCP 23)
NOTICE OF RECENT DECISION IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION
Plaintiffs, v. TO
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIERS, INC.,
10/03/2014 229 ORDER SCHEDULING TRIAL AND PRETRIAL MATTERS. Signed by Judge JEFFREY S.
WHITE on 10/3/14. (jjoS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 10/3/2014) (Entered: 10/03/2014)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MORRIS BICKLEY, et al.,
SCHNEIDER NATIONAL, INC., et al.,
Case No. 08-cv-05806-JSW
ORDER SCHEDULING TRIAL AND PRETRIAL MATTERS
Following the Case Management Conference held
on September 26, 2014, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that the Case Management Statement is adopted, except as expressly modified
Order. It is further ORDERED that:
Jury Trial Date: Monday, January 11, 2016 at 8:00 a.m.,
Jury Selection: Wednesday, January 6, 2016 at 8:00 a.m.
Pretrial Conference: Monday, December 7, 2015 at 2:00 p.m.
Last Day to Hear Dispositive Motions: Friday, September 11, 2015 at 9:00 A.M.
Last Day for Expert Discovery: August
Close of ALL Discovery: August 31, 2015
The parties are reminded that a failure voluntarily
to disclose information pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) or to supplement disclosures or discovery
Minute Entry: Further Case Management
Conference held on 9/26/2014 before Judge Jeffrey S. White (Date Filed: 9/26/2014). ALL Discovery due by 8/31/2015. Expert
Witness List due by 8/3/2015. Jury Selection set for 1/6/2016 08:00 AM in Courtroom 5, 2nd Floor, Oakland before Hon. Jeffrey
S. White. Jury Trial set for 1/11/2016 08:00 AM in Courtroom 5, 2nd Floor, Oakland before Hon. Jeffrey S. White. Motion
Hearing set for 9/11/2015 09:00 AM in Courtroom 5, 2nd Floor, Oakland before Hon. Jeffrey S. White. Pretrial Conference
set for 12/7/2015 02:00 PM in Courtroom 5, 2nd Floor, Oakland before Hon. Jeffrey S. White. (Court Reporter Diane Skillman.)
(jjoS, COURT STAFF) (Date Filed: 9/26/2014) (Entered: 09/26/2014)
JOINT CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT, filed
by Morris Bickley, Raymond Grewe, Dennis Vanhorn, Schneider National Carriers, Inc.. (Saltzman, Stanley) (Filed on 9/19/2014)
Modified on 9/22/2014 (jlmS, COURT STAFF). (Entered: 09/19/2014)
ORDER by Judge JEFFREY S. WHITE denying 221 Motion to Reinstate Stay (jjoS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/16/2014) (Entered:
SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIERS, INC. WAS IN VIOLATION OF
CALIFORNIA SLAPP Law,see:
strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) is a lawsuit that is intended to censor, intimidate and silence
critics by burdening them with the cost of a legal defense until they abandon their criticism or opposition.
The typical SLAPP plaintiff
does not normally expect to win the lawsuit. The plaintiff's goals are accomplished if the defendant succumbs to fear,
intimidation, mounting legal costs or simple exhaustion and abandons the criticism. A SLAPP may also intimidate others from
participating in the debate. A SLAPP is often preceded by a legal threat.
The difficulty, of course, is that plaintiffs
do not present themselves to the Court admitting that their intent is to censor, intimidate or silence their critics. Hence,
the difficulty in drafting SLAPP legislation, and in applying it, is to craft an approach which affords an early termination
to invalid abusive suits, without denying a legitimate day in court to valid good faith claims.
SCHNIEDER’S purpose in filing a
law suit against me was to force me to drop the workman compensation claim from the injury I received 1/13/09.
OBJECTOR AND INTERVENOR WALTER ELLIS’S OBJECTIONS TO CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
ORDER from 9th CCA filed re: Notice of Appeal to
9th Circuit Court of Appeals 146
filed by Walter L. Ellis CCA # 13-56665. A review of the docket reflects that appellant has not paid the docketing and filing
fees for this appeal. Within 21 days from the date of this order, appellant shall: (1) file a motion
with this court to proceed in forma pau peris; (2) pay$455.00 to the district court as the docketing and filing fees for
this appeal and provide proof of payment to this court; or (3) otherwise show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed
for failure to prosecute. See the document for all of the details. Order received in this district on 9/24/2013. (dmap)
NOTIFICATION by Circuit Court of Appellate Docket
Number 13-56665 9th CCA regarding Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 146
. (dmap) (Entered: 09/24/2013)
FILING FEE LETTER issued as to Objector Walter L.
Ellis re Notice of Appeal to 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 146
. (dmap) (Entered: 09/23/2013)
NOTICE OF APPEAL to the 9th CCA filed by Objector
Walter L. Ellis. Appeal of Judgment 145
. Filed On: 08/21/2013; Entered On: 08/21/2013; Filing fee $ 455 billed. (dmap) (Entered: 09/23/2013)
L. ELLIS, Pro Se E-mail:
STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
ALAN KRUMBINE, an individual, et.
al.; on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated,
SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIERS, INC., a Nevada Corporation,
Case No.: 10-CV-4565-GHK (JEMx)
OBJECTOR AND INTERVENOR WALTER ELLIS’S OBJECTIONS
TO CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
Date Filed: June
COURT AND ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant
to the Class Action Notice (“the Notice”) mailed to the class members in the above-entitled action, objector and
intervenor Walter L. Ellis (“Ellis”) hereby objects to the final approval of the class action settlement agreement
(“the Agreement”) on numerous grounds.
PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE
that Ellis will appear and object to the final approval of the class action settlement at the class action fairness hearing
currently set to be heard on August 5, 2013.
PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that Ellis intends
to file a motion to intervene in this action pursuant to the Private Attorneys General Act and he also intends to file a motion
to decertify this class action.
Dated: June 24, 2013
Walter L. Ellis, Pro Se
OBJECTIONS TO CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
Ellis hereby objects to the Agreement that was entered into in the above-entitled action between the plaintiffs, on
the one hand, and the defendants on the other hand. Ellis objects to the Agreement on the following grounds:
First, Ellis objects to the Agreement on the grounds that it does not appear to be fair or adequate. The
evidence suggests that there are hundreds of class members who are covered by the Agreement; however, the settlement amount
is only $3,500,000 which suggests that the each class member will receive only a miniscule amount from the settlement. Defendants
are very profitable companies; wherefore, it does not appear that the punishment fits the crime in this instance. Ellis argues
that the settlement amount should be sufficient enough to deter other companies from engaging in similar conduct.
Second, Ellis objects to the settlement on the grounds that this action should be expanded to include additional
causes of action. The evidence suggests that Defendants intentionally stole wages from Ellis and thousands of other aggrieved
employees over a long period of time; wherefore, Defendants should be held liable for their wrongful acts. Additionally, Ellis
argues that Defendants have a well-documented history of retaliating against employees who complain about their working conditions;
wherefore, Ellis argues that this action should be expanded to include a cause of action for retaliation. Ellis further argues
that this action should be expanded to include causes of action for theft and conversion of labor, fraud and deceit, conspiracy
to commit fraud, violation of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act and violations of Labor Code sections 98.6,
216, 223, 232.5 and 1102.5.
Third, Ellis argues that the class should be expanded
to include additional “aggrieved employees” pursuant to the PAG Act. In and around 2004, the California Legislature
signed into law the PAG Act which provides that an “aggrieved employee” can file a lawsuit against an employer
for any violation of the Labor Code and the other “aggrieved employees” can then benefit from a judgment entered
against said employer. Ellis argues that this action should be expanded to include all “aggrieved employees” and
applicants who were affected by Defendants’ Labor Code violations throughout the State of California and not just the
class as defined in this lawsuit.
Fourth, Ellis objects to the Agreement on the
grounds that the release is overly broad. The Agreement requires that the class members release claims that were never actually
litigated in this action including, but not limited to, claims for race and gender discrimination. Additionally, the Agreement
requires that the named plaintiffs release their individual claims when said claims were never actually litigated in this
action. The named plaintiffs should not be punished for acting as class representatives. The Agreement specifically states
that the class members are required to release all claims that “were asserted or reasonably could have been asserted
in this Action”. Ellis argues that said language is overly broad and the Agreement should be revised to notify the class
members that they have a right to pursue other claims against Defendants that were not explicitly released by the Agreement.
Fifth, Ellis objects to the Agreement on the grounds that the PAGA payment is insufficient and
should be increased to $5,000,000. The Agreement provides that the PAGA payment will not exceed five percent of the total
settlement amount which Ellis believes is insufficient to deter Defendants from further violating the Labor Code. Ellis argues
that based on the facts alleged in this complaint, the PAGA penalties alone should be in excess of $25,000,000. The class
attorneys have not sufficiently justified the enormous discount on the PAGA penalties; wherefore, Ellis argues that this Court
should not approve the Agreement because the PAGA payment is insufficient and does not serve the goal and purpose of the PAGA
Sixth, Ellis objects to the settlement on the grounds that
the PAGA claims should not have been certified as a class action. The California Legislature enacted the PAG Act for the benefit
of all California workers and not just a certain “class” of workers. (See Labor Code §§ 2698 et seq.)
Additionally, the California Supreme Court ruled that a PAGA action is an enforcement action and need not be certified as
a class action. (See Arias v. Superior Court (Angelo Dairy), 46 Cal.4th 969, 209 P.3d 923, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 (2009).)
Ellis further argues that class counsel cannot prove that a class action is superior to a representative PAGA action; wherefore,
Ellis argues that this Court should not approve the Agreement.
Seventh, Ellis objects to the Agreement on the grounds that the attorneys’ fee award is excessive. The Agreement
provides that the class counsel will receive 33 percent of the gross settlement fund; however, the lack of complexity and
the shortness of duration of this litigation clearly do not warrant attorneys’ fees in excess of a million dollars.
Additionally, lead attorneys Lee Gordon (“Gordon”) and Daniel Chaleff (“Chaleff”) spent 1591 and 431
hours, respectively, litigating this action and their assistants only spent a fraction of said time litigating this action.
The evidence suggests that Gordon and Chaleff billed the class members for work that could have been performed by lesser paid
assistants thereby defrauding the class members out of hundreds of thousands of dollars in attorneys’ fees. Ellis argues
that this Court should not just “rubber stamp” the attorneys’ fee award requested in this action. This Court
should require Gordon and Chaleff to explain why they spent more time litigating this action than their assistants in clear
contradiction to well-known law firm practices.
Eighth, Ellis objects to the
Agreement on the grounds that the class members were not given an opportunity to conduct discovery to determine the adequacy
of the settlement that was reached in this action. The class members should be allowed to review Defendants’ financial
statements in order to determine if the settlement is fair and adequate. The parties have not adequately explained why the
settlement amount should not be considerably more. Ellis argues that he should be given permission to contact the other class
members to discuss the fairness of the Agreement without interference from the Defendants or from class counsel.
Ninth, Ellis objects to the Agreement on the grounds that there appears to be fraud and collusion between
Plaintiffs’ counsel and Defendants’ counsel. Defendants agreed to pay Plaintiffs’ counsel over $1,000,000
in attorneys’ fees; however, Plaintiffs’ counsel failed to ensure that the class members were adequately compensated
for the injuries that they have sustained. Ellis hereby objects to the award of attorneys’ fees in this action. Additionally,
it appears that Plaintiffs’ attorneys and Defendants’ attorneys colluded with each other to discount the PAGA
claims without justification.
Finally, Ellis objects to the Agreement on the
grounds that the class members should be given an opportunity to select different class counsel to represent them in this
action. Ellis has received credible evidence which suggests that the class counsel appointed in this action have failed to
adequately represent the class members in other class actions that they have participated in.
REQUEST FOR LEAVE OF COURT TO FILE COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION
Should this Court approve the Agreement over Ellis’s objections, Ellis hereby requests that this Court
grant him leave of Court to file a complaint in intervention. Ellis argues that he has exhausted his administrative remedies
with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”) and with the Labor and Workforce Development Agency
(“LWDA”) wherefore he has standing to pursue additional claims against Defendants. Ellis argues that thousands
of current and former employees and applicants of Defendants will likely benefit from this action should this Court grant
his request for leave of Court to file a complaint in intervention.
Ellis further argues that Defendants
will not be prejudiced should this Court grant his request for leave of Court to file a complaint in intervention because
Defendants have known about his claims for several years and have had ample to prepare a defense to said claims. Ellis has
reason to believe that Defendants continue to discriminate against African-American and women employees in hirings, firings,
pay, promotions and other terms and conditions of employment; wherefore, Ellis argues that he should be granted permission
to vindicate the rights of the many.
Dated: June 24, 2013
Walter L. Ellis, pro se
HOW SCHNEIDER APPEAR TO MANIPULATE CERTAIN JUDGES
No JUSTICE for BLACKS in the CALIFORNIA UNJUST SYSTEM
My name is Walter Ellis, an AFRICAN AMERICAN who
believe and can confirm that most AFRICAN AMERICANS cannot receive justice especially in San Bernardino and Riverside, the
most racist judicial system in CALIFORNIA.
My most recent encounter with “Justice for White’s”
began when I was injured 1/13/2009, fired, denied medical treatment, denied protection from the RACIST Fontana PD, denied
Workman Compensation by Judge Chris Willmon all who appear to be in bed with SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIERS, INC.,
(SNI), www.truckerscomplaint.com / http://justiceforblacks.blogspot.com/ http://walter-ellis.blogspot.com/ / http://schneiderdotviolations.blogspot.com/
After being injured by SCHNEIDER I was terminated, sued for posting complaints on
web site(s). truckerscomplaint.com
It has been my contention
that when AFRICAN AMERICANS make complaints Federal agencies and the Judicial System most times fail to investigate.
I am a Litigant in Pro-Se being sued by SCHNEIDER
NATIONAL CARRIERS INC. for accusations I posted DEFAMATORY statements
on my web sites. See:
IN MITIGATION, ARGUED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW EXACTLY WHAT MATERIAL PLAINTIFF CONSIDERS DEROGATORY.... / CENTRAL
REFRGERATED / SWIFT TRUCKING COMPLAINTS / THESE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL IN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
WALTER L. ELLIS,
Defendant and Appellant,
SCHNEIDER NATIONAL, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Court of Appeals Case No.: G049501
Superior Court Case No.: CIVDS 906308
APPELLANT’S SUPPLEMENTAL LETTER BRIEF
WALTER L. ELLIS, In Pro Per
Appellant Walter L. Ellis (“Appellant” or
“Ellis”) submits this supplemental letter brief in response to the Court’s April 14, 2014 Order inviting
the parties to address the questions set forth below.
1. “Was the statement of damages insufficient to satisfy Code of Civil Procedure section 580's notice requirements,
rendering void the judgment awarding compensatory and punitive damages on Schneider National, Inc.'s and Schneider National
Carriers, Inc.'s (collectively Schneider) libel cause of action, because it was not served a reasonable time before Ellis's
answer was stricken as a terminating sanction?”
Appellant argues that Matera v. McLeod (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 44, 60-
62 is on point in this instance based on the fact that Appellant was clearly
not given proper notice of the award of compensatory and punitive damages before Appellant’s answer was stricken thereby
violating his due process rights. In Matera, the court cited Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co. (1950) 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 wherein it held that the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause
generally requires that a person be provided notice and an opportunity to be heard before the government deprives the person
of property through adjudication or some other form of individualized determination. The notice must be “reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity
to present their objections. [Citations.] The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information
[citation], and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance [citations].”
instance, respondents Schneider National Carriers, Inc. (“Schneider”) and Jeff Ames (collectively “Respondents”)
concede the following facts:
· Respondents sued Appellant after he posted on the internet allegations that Schneider stole millions of dollars
in unpaid wages from its own employees and systematically discriminated against African-Americans in the terms and conditions
of their employment. [CT 4309-4363].
· At the time that Respondents filed the complaint against Appellant they did not know whether
or not they had suffered any damages; wherefore, the complaint did not state the amount of damages sought.
· On June 21, 2010, the trial court granted Respondents’
motion for terminating sanctions and struck Appellant’s answer.
· On October 21, 2010, Respondents filed their statement of damages wherein they requested
$130,000 in compensatory damages and $ 560,000 in punitive damages. [CT 3648-3654].
A mere inspection of the aforementioned facts suggests that Appellant’s
constitutional due process rights were clearly violated because he was not served with the statement of damages prior to his
answer being stricken. Respondents argue that they were justified in violating Appellant’s constitutional due process
rights on the purported grounds that Respondents did not know that the amount of their damages at the time the complaint was
filed. It appears to be lost on Respondents that the mere purpose of Code of Civil Procedure Section 580 was to prevent the
type of situation that Appellant has fallen victim to in this instance wherein Appellant was blindsided by an unjustifiably
large demand for damages without being given ample time to respond. Appellant argues that this Court should follow Matera
and reverse the default judgment that was entered against him.
2. “Was the statement of damages insufficient to satisfy Code of Civil Procedure section 580's notice requirements,
rendering void the judgment awarding compensatory damages on Schneider's libel cause of action, because this was not a
personal injury or wrongful death action.”
law provides that where a plaintiff seeks to recover money or
damages, the amount sought generally must be stated in the complaint. (§ 425.10, subd. (a)(2).) There are
two exceptions to this rule: (1) “where an action is brought to recover actual or punitive damages for personal injury
or wrongful death, the amount demanded shall not be stated” (§ 425.10, subd. (b)); and (2) “[n]o claim for
exemplary [i.e., punitive] damages shall state an amount or amounts” (Civ.Code, § 3295, subd. (e)). Appellant argues
that the default judgment that was entered against him is void as a matter of law and should be reversed because the action
filed against him was not brought to recover actual or punitive damages for personal injury or wrongful death and Respondents
failed to prove that they were entitled to any punitive damages.
It is well settled that “[A] default judgment greater than the amount specifically demanded is void
as beyond the trial court's jurisdiction.” (Greenup v. Rodman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 822, 826, 231 Cal.Rptr.
220, 726 P.2d 1295.) Because the complaint in the present case did not seek damages for personal
injury or wrongful death, Respondents’ statement of damages fails to provide the formal notice required before Respondents
may obtain compensatory damages exceeding the amount requested in the complaint. Appellant argues that Respondents
never should have filed this action against Appellant because they did not suffer any damages as a result of his actions and
they should not have been allowed to “trump up” damages without giving Appellant proper notice of said damages.
3. “If the judgment awarding Schneider compensatory and punitive damages
on its libel cause of action is void, what is the appropriate remedy on appeal and on remand?”
The appropriate remedy on appeal and on
remand for Respondents’
maliciously prosecuting this
action against Appellate is to issue an order vacating the default judgment and directing the trial court to dismiss this
action with prejudice. Appellant also should be granted his costs on appeal.
Appellant was well within his rights
to publish information about Schneider’s rampant Labor Code violations and its discriminatory labor practices on his
website. As the Supreme Court has recognized, the Internet is “ ‘the most participatory form of mass speech yet
developed’ ” and thus Internet communication is “entitled to ‘the highest protection from governmental
intrusion.’ ” (Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union (1997) 521 U.S. 844, 863.) Where, as here, the
gravamen of the lawsuit is the content of Appellant’s website, the action arises from an act in furtherance of the right
of free speech. (Kronemyer v. Internet Movie Database Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 941, 946–947; see also Barrett
v. Rosenthal (2006) 40 Cal.4th 33, 41, fn. 4 and cases cited therein [Web sites accessible to the public are public forums
for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute].)
Is there any evidence in
the record of Ellis's financial condition that would support the award of $560,000 in punitive damages to Schneider?
There is no evidence in the record which
suggests that Ellis’s financial
support the award of $560,000 in punitive damages to Schneider. Respondents argue that said award for punitive damages is
justified in this instance based on Ellis’s alleged misconduct in regards to the trial court’s discovery orders.
Any alleged failure by Ellis to comply with the trial court’s discovery orders was directly related to his medical condition
and based on the fact that Ellis timely filed a peremptory challenge against the Honorable George M. Pacheco (“Judge
Ellis provided overwhelming
evidence which proves that he suffers from debilitating mental and physical ailments which has interfered with his ability
to defend against this action. [CT 165-425; CT 4589-4654]. The trial court ignored Ellis’s evidence regarding his medical
condition and thereby abused its discretion by denying his Motion to Vacate the Default Judgment. [CT 4309-4363] Ellis argues
that any reasonable person would have neglected to prosecute an action if their very health was at risk. The test of whether
neglect was excusable is whether ‘a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances’ might have
made the same error. (See Bettencourt v. Los Rios Community College Dist. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 270, 276.)
Additionally, Ellis filed a timely peremptory challenge against Judge
Pacheco wherein Ellis was forced to take a legal position so that he would not waive his right to challenge Judge Pacheco’s
jurisdiction over his claims in light of the fact that Judge Pacheco refused to recuse himself from presiding over this matter.
[CT 2551-2567] There is no evidence in the record which supports Respondents’ contentions that Ellis acted in bad faith.
There is also no evidence in the record which shows that Ellis’s financial condition supports the trial court’s
award of punitive damages. Respondents’ assertions that they needed to conduct discovery to determine Ellis’s
financial condition is without merit. The mere fact that Schneider employed Ellis and paid him low wages and then injured
him on the job wherein Schneider disputed Ellis’s workers’ compensation claim suggests that Respondents were well
aware of Ellis’s low socioeconomic status and of the fact that Ellis had no means of paying an award for punitive damages.
For all the above reasons, this Court should reverse the default judgment
that was entered Appellant and grant him his costs on appeal. This Court should also order that all trial court rulings affected
by the void order be reversed.
Dated: May 27, 2014
Walter L. Ellis
Appellant, In Propria Personam
Court of Appeals of California, Fourth
District, Division Three.
Because we conclude the award of punitive
damages must be stricken, we need not consider whether the complete lack of any evidence of Ellis’s financial condition
at the time of the default prove-up hearing requires reversal as well. (Adams v. Murakami (1991) 54 Cal.3d 105, 109 [“an award
of punitive damages cannot be sustained on appeal unless the trial record contains meaningful evidence of the defendant’s
financial condition” at the time of trial].)
Filed July 11, 2014.
SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIERS LAWSUIT AFTER
DRIVER FILED DOT COMPLAINT
On 1/12/2009 Ellis filed a DOT complaint
against SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIER, Inc... In retaliation SCHNEIDER filed a MALICIOUS LAW SUIT AGAINST Ellis, in the
amount of $701,000.00. Upon appealing Judge Pacheco’s decision the Appeal Court ruled against SCHNEIDER on COMPLAINT
FOR DAMAGES, LIBEL PER SE; AND INFRIGEMENT AND DILUTION OF SERVICE MARK, see: Appeal Court “OPINION”
On 1/13/09 after filing a DOT Complaint, LUKE took documents, including my log books in the Drivers lunch
room. I was later injured (broken rib, and knee injury) by BRANDON while attempting to escape from building. Luke later fired
me stating," Walter you are being fired for log book violations and refusing a load on 1/12/09"
In retaliation for Ellis
filing the above DOT complaint against SCHNEIDER, the company on 4/30/2009 filed a MALICIOUS LAW SUIT against Ellis……………………………………………………………
On May 8, 2009 I was served by SCHNEIDER’S Attorney: David S. Binder Tharpe & Howell
15250 Ventura Bl.,
9th Floor, Sherman Oaks, CA. 91403, TEL.: (818) 205-9955
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES, LIBEL PER SE; AND INFRIGEMENT AND DILUTION OF SERVICE MARK, UNLAWFUL RECORDINGS
OF CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION (Penal Code 632) (SEE LINK BELOW):
SCHNEIDER v ELLIS MALICIOUS LAWSUIT click here to download file
On 1/12/2009 Ellis filed a DOT complaint against SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIER,
Inc. In retaliation SCHNEIDER filed a MALICIOUS LAW SUIT AGAINST Ellis, in the amount of $701,000.00. Upon appealing
Judge Pacheco's decision the Appeal Court ruled against SCHNEIDER on COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES, LIBEL PER SE;
AND INFRIGEMENT AND DILUTION OF SERVICE MARK, see: Appeal Court "OPINION"
SCHNEIDER NATIONAL, INC. v. ELLIS No. G049501.
SCHNEIDER NATIONAL, INC., et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. WALTER L. ELLIS, Defendant and Appellant.
Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District,
Filed July 11, 2014.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MORRIS BICKLEY, MICHAEL
DENNIS VAN HORN and DOUGLAS PUMRO I ,
Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
NATIONAL CARRIERS, INC., and DOES
Superior Court Case No.:CIVDS906308
CASE NO.: 08-CV-05806-JSW
NOTICE OF LIEN_REOUEST TO BE PLACED ON PROOF OF SERVICE LIST FOR ALL PLEADINGS AND DISCOVERY
FiledOB/25/11 Page2 of
WALTER L. ELLIS AND HIS ATTORNEY OF RECORD: YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, ARE
HEREBY NOTICED that SCHNEIDER
NATIONAL, INC., SCHNEIDER NATIONAL CARRIERS, INC. and JEFF AMES
claim a lien of first priority upon any
settlement or judgment rendered in favor of the Plaintiff for amounts payable pursuant to the following Orders for Discovery Sanctions
$10,276.50) against WALTER L. ELLIS ("ELLIS") in the matter
of Schneider National,
Inc. et al. v. Ellis, Case Number CIVDS906308, which is pending before the State of California Superior
Court, County of San Bernardino:
Court-ordered discovery sanctions in the
$2,400.00 against ELLIS for his failure to provide
$6,236.00 against ELLIS for his disobedience of a prior Court Order to provide further responses to written discovery.
Court-ordered discovery sanctions in the
amount of $1,640.50 against ELLIS for his disobedience of a prior Court
Order compelling his deposition.
NOTICE OF LIEN and REQUEST TO BE PLACED ON
PROOF OF SERVICE LIST FOR ALL
PLEADINGS AND DISCOVERY
Case 2:11-cv-08557-CAS-DTB Document 430-1 Filed 08/30/13 Page 1 of 27 Page ID
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CAIFORNIA EASTERN DIVISION
Case No. CV 11-08557 CAS (DTBx)
SCHNEIDER LOGISTICS TRANSLOADING
AND DISTRIBUTION, INC.’S SEPARATE STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Hearing Date: November 4, 2013
TO PLAINTIFFS AND THEIR ATTORNEYS
Defendant Schneider Logistics Transloading and Distribution, Inc. hereby submits the following Separate
Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and supporting evidence in support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
SEPARATE STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED
STATEMENT OF CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Plaintiffs’ claims against SLTD fail as a matter of law
cannot establish that SLTD is a joint employer with Impact under California law.
Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal.4th 35 (2010); Futrell v. Payday Cal., Inc.,
Plaintiffs’ claims against SLTD fail as a matter of law because Plaintiffs
cannot establish that SLTD is a joint employer with
Impact under Fair Labor
Standards Act. Bonnette v. California Health and Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465
(9th Cir. 1983);
Moreau v. Air France, 356 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2004); Maddock v. KB
Homes, Inc., 631 F.Supp.2d 1226 (C.D.
3. Plaintiffs’ claims against SLTD fail as a matter of law because Plaintiffs
that SLTD is a joint employer with Premier under California law.
Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal.4th 35 (2010); Futrell v.
Payday Cal., Inc., 190
Cal.App.4th 419 (2010).
4. Plaintiffs’ claims against SLTD fail as a matter of law because
cannot establish that SLTD is a joint employer with Premier under the Fair Labor
Standards Act. Bonnette
v. California Health and Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465
(9th Cir. 1983); Moreau v. Air France, 356
F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2004); Maddock v. KB Homes, Inc., 631 F.Supp.2d 1226 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
DATED: August 30,
2013 OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK
& STEWART, P.C. By: /s/ Douglas J. Farmer
for Defendant SCHNEIDER LOGISTICS TRANSLOADING AND DISTRIBUTION, INC.
Case 2:11-cv-08557-CAS-DTB Document 430-1 Filed 08/30/13 Page 27 of 27 Page ID
OBJECTOR AND INTERVENOR RANDALL PITTMEN'S
NOTICE OF JOINDER TO WALTER ELLIS'S OBJECTIONS TO CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT 117 filed
by Intervenor Randall Pittman.(shb) (Entered: 07/01/2013)
24, 2013, Objector and Intervenor Walter Ellis (“Ellis”) filed his objections to the class action settlement agreement
(“the Agreement”) that was entered into between, the Plaintiffs on the one hand and, the Defendants on the other
hand, in this action. On July 3, 2013, this Court issued an order (“the Order”) requiring Ellis to file a supplemental
brief indicating his dates of employment with Defendants.
In reply to the Order, Ellis argues that he should be granted
permission to intervene in this action for three reasons. First, Ellis argues that a PAGA action is an enforcement action
and not a class action.
III. LEGAL Argument: A PAGA Action
is an Enforcement Action and Not a Class Action
Defendants contend that Ellis has no standing to object to the Agreement based on the fact that Ellis is not a class member
in this action based on the fact that he never worked for Defendants as a mechanic. Ellis concedes that during the relevant
time period he worked for Defendants as a truck driver and not as a mechanic; however, because this is a PAGA action Ellis
argues that he has standing to intervene in this action on behalf of the LWDA. The California Supreme Court has ruled that
a PAGA action is in the nature of an enforcement action and is not a class action. (See Arias v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 4th
969, 975 (2009).) The PAGA was adopted to empower aggrieved employees to act as private attorneys general and to authorize
them to seek civil penalties for Labor Code violations that previously could be assessed only by state agencies. (Dunlap v.
Superior Court (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 330, 336).
The Class Members Will be Prejudiced Should Ellis be Denied the Right to Intervene in This Action
Ellis argues that the class members in this action will be prejudiced should this Court deny him the right to intervene in
this action. Ellis has objected to the Agreement for the purpose of increasing the amount of wages paid to the class members
and to increase the amount of the PAGA penalties allocated to the LWDA. Ellis argues that the class members will benefit from
an increased PAGA payment based on the fact that the LWDA will use said funds for the benefit of all California workers. The
PAGA statute provides that 75 percent of PAGA penalties collected by an “aggrieved employee” must be paid to the
LWDA. (See Labor Code § 2699(i))
Ellis further argues that by intervening
in this action he is not requesting that the conceded wages owed to the class members be delayed; however, he is requesting
that this Court not approve the PAGA penalties and the attorneys’ fees requested in this action. Under California law,
an employer must pay an employee any conceded wages owed and without condition. (See Labor Code Labor Code § 206.5) The
evidence suggests that class counsel and Defendants counsel have colluded with each other to enter a settlement agreement
that only benefits them. The attorneys fees requested in this action are clearly not warranted.
Ellis further argues that by intervening in this action he is not requesting that the
conceded wages owed to the class members be delayed; however, he is requesting that this Court not approve the PAGA penalties
and the attorneys’ fees requested in this action. Under California law, an employer must pay an employee any conceded
wages owed and without condition. (See Labor Code Labor Code § 206.5) The evidence suggests that class counsel and Defendants
counsel have colluded with each other to enter a settlement agreement that only benefits them. The attorneys fees requested
in this action are clearly not warranted. In
determining what fees are reasonable, a district court may consider a
lawyer’s misconduct, which affects the value of the lawyer’s services. (See Image Technical, 136 F.3d at 1358.
A court has broad equitable power to deny attorneys’ fees (or to require an attorney to disgorge fees already received)
when an attorney represents clients with conflicting interests. (See Silbiger v. Prudence Bonds Corp., 180 F.2d 917, 920 (2d
Cir. 1950).) This Court should allow Ellis and Pittman to shine a light on the fraud that was committed in this action thereby
protecting the unnamed class members from imminent harm.
Based on the foregoing, Ellis respectfully requests that this Court accept his objections to the Agreement
and grant him permission to intervene in this action pursuant to the PAG Act. Dated:
July 13, 2013 Walter L. Ellis, Pro Se